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ARGUMENT
Respondents1 brief in this case has raised a few new issues
and arguments to which this reply brief will respond.

It should

be noted at the outset that there is no dispute over what law to
apply to the case; the dispute is over the application of that
law to this particular case.

The Respondents have attempted to

argue that Petitioner is not entitled to unemployment benefits
under either the "good cause" standard for a voluntary termination of employment or under the "equity and good conscience"
standard.

As the following will show their arguments are without

merit.
GOOD CAUSE
Respondents argued that Petitioner did not have good cause
for leaving her employment because the record did not support the
contention that she would have suffered actual or potential
economic hardship by remaining at her job.

Respondents justified

this claim by stating that Petitioner was not delinquent on her
bill payments at the time she terminated her employment, so no
actual economic harm had occurred, and that she did not know how
much money her husband would be able to send herr
potential economic harm could be demonstrated.

so that no

Respondents have

misunderstood the meanings of the words "actual" and "potential."
Actual harm is not harm that is occurring at this very moment; it
is harm that is certain to occur.

Petitioner demonstrated that

she would suffer actual harm by remaining at her employment because she would receive no money at all from her husband for at
1

least one month and probably a minimum of two months.

She t

faced an immediate actual shortfall of $500.00 per month betw
her income and her expenses, and a certainty that in a short t
she would be delinquent on her financial obligations.

She a

faced potential economic harm because it was likely, although
certain, that the amount her husband would be able to send
would not cover the shortfall between her income and her famil
expenses.

She did not know how much her husband would be able

send because neither she nor her husband had any idea how h
his expenses would be every month; but the potential was gr
that he would not be able to send as much as $500.00.

Potent

harm is not harm that can be demonstrated to a certainty; it
harm that has some likelihood of occurring.

Such harm was c

tainly present in this case.
Respondents also claim that Petitioner did not have g
cause for her termination because she did not remain employed
use two weeks of accumulated vacation time to look for a job
New Mexico.

This claim overlooks three facts:

first, Petitio

faced an absolute deadline for leaving Salt Lake City; she had
move before

her

husband

left for the service.

Remain

nominally employed but on annual leave for her last two we
would have served no purpose.

Second, Petitioner will not

paid unemployment for the first two weeks after her terminat
because she was paid for her vacation time; for unemployment p
poses her status for those two weeks is the same as if she
been still employed and on vacation.

Finally, and perhaps m

importantly, Petitioner had to give a month f s notice to ]

employer before she left her employment.

She did so (Record, p.

39), and thus demonstrated that she was a responsible employee.
She should not be punished for that responsible act; adopting
Respondents' requirement that she remain employed until the very
end, even exhausting her vacation time before she terminated her
employmentr would do so.
EQUITY AND GOOD CONSCIENCE
Respondents argued that denying benefits to Petitioner would
not be against equity and good conscience.

The bases for that

claim are stated on pages 18 and 19 of Respondents' brief.
bases are not supported by the facts of the case.

Those

Respondents

state that Petitioner chose to give up assured income for certain
unemployment.

On the contrary, Petitioner had no choice; the in-

come from her job was suddenly, through no fault of her own, insufficient to meet her family's expenses.

She had to either in-

crease her income or decrease the expenses, or both.

She could

not increase her income sufficiently in Salt Lake City (Record,
p. 42) , so she was forced to leave her employment and move in
with her in-laws, who would support her and her children while
she looked for work.
Respondents also stated that Petitioner chose to move her
family from a greater job market to an area where fewer jobs were
available

n

on the mere rumor that wages were higher."

That

statement fails to consider that the main reason for the move to
New Mexico was the fact that Petitioner could no longer support
her family in Salt Lake City and moving allowed her to reduce the
family's expenses to virtually zero.

By moving she was able to

prevent economic hardship to her family.

She had no choice I

to do so.
Respondents argue that the fact that Petitioner has souc
employment

in fast food

restaurants somehow demonstrates tl

Petitioner's actions were not reasonable.

In reality that f<

shows how committed Petitioner is to remaining in the work for<
The wages from such a job would not have been sufficient to al!
the family to move out of the home of Petitioners1 in-laws, 1
it would have helped support the family and kept it somewl
independent.
Finally, Respondents claim that Petitioner did not sea
for work for "several" weeks and imply that she did not have
good reason for her actions.

The Record shows the following:

April 5th Petitioner worked her last day at her job in Salt L
City (p. 38).

By the week of April 20th, two weeks later,

was searching for employment in the Crownpoint area; at the he
ing she indicated that this was her "first week" (p.40).

It

reasonable to assume that she spent the days between the 6th
the 20th packing the family's belongings, moving to New Mexi
and unpacking.

To accomplish those tasks in only two weeks is

achievement indeed.
CONCLUSION
This Court has stated several times that the Employm
Security Act "is not designed to provide benefits to those
will not work,8' but "it is to be liberally construed and
ministered to assist those who are attached to the work force
need a bridge between jobs."

Chagman v. Industrial Commissi.on

fltali, 700 p.2d 1099 at 1102 (1985); Salt Lake City Cory, v.
Department of Employment Security, 657 p.2d 1312 at 1317 (1982).
Respondents would ignore this mandate and adopt a crabbed interpretation of the Act to deny Petitioner the bridge she needed*
Such an interpretation would not be fair under the circumstances
of this case and is not supported by the record.

The record

shows that Petitioner was forced to leave her employment because
she and her family faced actual and potential economic harm if
she remained at her job, and that she is still very much connected to the work force.
cause to end her employment

Faced with that fact, she had good
and her actions were reasonable.

Petitioner is entitled to unemployment benefits under either the
"good cause" standard

or the

"equity and good conscience"

standard.

Paul Fyfe
Attorney for Petitioner
DNA-People's Legal Services
P.O. Box 116
Crownpoint, New Mexico 87313

